No Economic Cooperation Until the War Ends: The Firm Stance of the U.S.

At the G20 summit on August 31, 2026, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent made it clear to Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov that economic cooperation was off the table "until the war ends." This scene transcends a mere diplomatic refusal, prompting a reevaluation of the complex relationship between war and economics. Is the strategy of rejecting economic cooperation during wartime an effective means of increasing pressure on Russia, or does it paradoxically complicate long-term diplomatic solutions?

The firm rejection by the U.S. Treasury Secretary of Russia's request for economic cooperation at the G20 summit sent a clear message: no economic incentives will be offered as long as the war continues. This indicates that the U.S. is using sanctions not merely as punitive measures but as diplomatic leverage to end the war. In fact, the U.S. has maintained extensive sanctions across finance, energy, and technology sectors to cut off Russia's war funding. These sanctions are intended to exert real pressure on the Russian economy while also serving as a strategic tool to secure leverage for negotiations.S1

However, sanctions do not always yield the expected results. A 2025 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted that while sanctions and export controls have impacted the Russian economy, Russia has not been completely overcome by them. Notably, key sectors like the military industry continue to secure technology and resources. This reality underscores that sanctions alone are not a sufficient condition to end the war.S2

An analysis by MIT's Security Studies Program highlights the paradox that trade between nations does not entirely cease even during wartime. Initially, sanctions targeted military-related items, but over time, they expanded to include intermediate goods and raw materials. Nevertheless, some trade persists, revealing the limitations of sanctions. This suggests that the strategy of refusing economic cooperation does not imply a complete severance but operates within a complex web of interdependence.S3

Historically, the U.S. and Russia have used economic cooperation as a key tool for normalizing diplomatic relations. Economic and technological cooperation bodies, like the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in the 1990s, supported Russia's transition to a market economy and laid the groundwork for bilateral relations. This historical experience shows that economic cooperation can be more than a mere exchange of benefits; it can be a mechanism for building trust. Thus, resuming economic cooperation after the war could be the first step in restoring relations, rather than just a reward.S4

Does the strategy of refusing economic cooperation during wartime make diplomatic solutions more difficult? Some experts argue that ending the war without economic incentives might weaken Russia's motivation to negotiate. Conversely, making economic rewards a precondition for ending the war could undermine the sincerity of negotiations. Economic cooperation could serve as an incentive to end the war, but it could also become a test of the negotiations' authenticity.

Recently, discussions about resuming economic relations with Russia have emerged in Europe and the U.S. For instance, the Belfer Center warns that linking long-term economic cooperation with peace agreements is concerning. If the scope of economic cooperation extends beyond resolving the war, uncontrollable variables may intervene, affecting Ukraine and its allies. This suggests that economic cooperation should remain a post-peace task, not a condition for peace.S5

The U.S. strategy of refusing economic cooperation during the war can be seen as a means to maintain pressure on Russia while securing negotiating power. However, considering the limited effectiveness of sanctions and the importance of economic cooperation in restoring diplomatic trust, resuming economic relations after the war should be a strategic choice, not just a reward. Economic cooperation could be the starting point for restoring relations after the war, but it should not be a precondition for peace.

The remaining question is how the U.S. and the West will design economic cooperation after the war ends. How will they balance short-term sanctions with long-term cooperation, and how will they incorporate Ukraine's interests? These questions demand political and moral considerations beyond mere economic gains as they work to reshape the post-war global order.